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SURVEY OF SOUTHWESTERN LAW FOR 1949
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
I. POWERS
Texas. Whether the final determination that property is in
fact a public nuisance subject to abatement can be delegated to
local legislative or administrative boards was considered by the
supreme court in City of Houston v. Lurie.' The court held that
this question is essentially judicial in nature and "that the prop-
erty owner is not to be deprived of his right to a judicial determi-
nation of the question whether his property is a public nuisance
to be abated by demolition."
As pointed out in the opinion, a previous Texas case had
declared:
"The State, in the exercise of its public power, may denominate
certain things to be public nuisances, and because of their having that
character provide for their summary abatement. This power is limited
to declaring only those things to be such nuisances which are so in fact,
since even the State may not denounce that as a nuisance which is not
in fact. Tiedeman's Limitation of Police Power, Section 122a. The
police power is subordinate to the Constitution, as is every other power
of the government. Where the legislature has found and defined, as
expressed in its statute, a certain thing to be a public nuisance, only in
clear cases would courts be warranted in going behind its findings and
determining the contrary. But whether something not defined as a
public nuisance by the statute is such under its general terms is un-
doubtedly a judicial question."'2
Texas thus follows the general rule that "unless property is
within that class which is designated and condemned by statute
or the common law as a nuisance, the determination of the ques-
I - Tex.-, 224 S. W. 2d. 871, 875 (1949).
2 Stockwell v. State, 110 Tex. 550, 554, 555, 221 S. W. 932, 934 (1920), annotated in
12 A.L.R. 1116 (1921).
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tion as to whether or not it is a nuisance becomes a judicial one,
and its final determination cannot be effectuated by an adminis-
trative officer or board."3
Oklahoma. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma held inoperative,
as unauthorized, a rule of the State Board of Medical Examiners
which made ineligible for license a graduate of medical schools
which were not located within the United States or Canada.' Peti-
tioner, a graduate of Royal University of Florence, Italy, Faculty
of Medicine, had made application to the medical board for per-
mission to take the regular examination prescribed by law for a
license to practice medicine and surgery. After the application
was denied, he appealed to the appeal board designated by stat-
ute, which held that he was entitled to take the examination. On
application of the medical board the supreme court granted writ
of certiorari to review the action.
By statute the medical board was authorized to adopt rules nec-
essary to carry into effect the provisions of the Medical Practice
Act.5 One of the provisions of the act was that the applicant must
submit satisfactory evidence that he was a graduate of a legally
chartered medical college or university whose requirements for
graduation at the time of graduation should not be less than those
prescribed by the Association of American Medical Colleges for
that particular year.6 Pursuant to the statutory grant of power,
the medical board adopted rules. Rule 1 required that all appli-
cants must have graduated from a class "A" school, as classified
by the Association of American Medical Colleges; Rule 7, subse-
qently adopted, provided that since it was not possible to obtain
proper information as to the standing of medical schools in foreign
countries, graduates of schools not within the United States and
Canada were not eligible for license.
3 See 39 Am. Jur. 295, Nuisances, sec. 15..
' Application of State Board of Medical Examiners, -Okla.-, 206 P. 2d.
211 (1949).
5 59 OKLA. STAT. ANN. (Perm. Ed.) H§ 481-515.
659 OKLA. STAT. ANN. (Perm. Ed.) § 493.
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The granting of the license was made mandatory when the
statutory requirements were met and was not discretionary with
the Medical Board. The statute did not require a diploma from a
class "A" school as a condition precedent to taking the examina-
tion, but the rules did, and the question then was-did the rule
have the force of law?
In declaring that these rules did not have the force of law, the
court stated:
"The only authorized basis for any rule is that it is a means to the
accomplishment of the legislative purpose expressed in the statute and
its quality is to be judged by the effect thereof when used. If conducive
to such purpose it is authorized by the statute. If not so conducive it is
not authorized by the statute and therefore without the force of law." 7
It was held, therefore, that the applicant could not be debarred
from applying because he did not have a diploma from a class
"A" school.
In view of the present growth of administrative power, the
following statement, which was quoted by the Oklahoma Su-
preme Court in this case, seems appropriate:
"It is a fundamental principle of our system of government that the
rights of men are to be determined by the law itself, and not by the
let or leave of administrative officers or bureaus. This principle ought not
to be surrendered for convenience, or in effect nullified for the same
expediency. ' 8
New Mexico. "The legislature cannot delegate the power to
make laws" but "the legislature still may enact laws to take effect
when certain facts exist, and delegate to some other branch of
the government the duty of determining the existence of such
facts."9 In a recent New Mexico case the court held that a statute0
authorizing incorporated cities or towns to annex adjacent terri-
tories did not constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative
power to a board of arbitrators created by the act; that the act
7 206 P. 2d. at 215.
842 Am. Jur. 342, Public Administrative Law, sec. 45.
9 Cox v. City of Albuquerque, 53 N. M. 334, 207 P. 2d. 1017, 1022 (1949).
'ON. M. Laws 1947, c. 211; N. M. STAT. 1941 ANN. §§ 14-615-14-620.
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did not enforce compulsory arbitration on the parties involved;
and that Article 9, Section 12, of the New Mexico Constitution
was not violated by the residents of the annexed territory con-
tributing in the form of taxes to the payment of pre-existing
bonded indebtedness, in the creation of which the owners of the
annexed lands did not have a vote or voice. The court laid down
the test as whether the legislature intended to create a board and
then confer on it legislative power "to grant or deny annexation
upon the petition of interested parties, with or without reason, and
regardless of the board's finding on a material fact ordered, fol-
lowing investigation"; or if the legislature "intended ascertain-
ment of the fact to be investigated should conclude the question
of annexation." The conclusion of the court was that the factual
test was intended.
II. PROCEDURE
Texas. Board of Adjustment of City of Fort Worth v. Stoval11
presents the problem whether a board of adjustment is a proper
party to a suit filed to review one of its orders, and whether it has
the right to appeal from a court judgment setting aside its order.
The board had granted a permit to build an outdoor moving pic-
ture theatre, and Stovall filed suit in the district court to review
the order. The board of adjustment was named defendant as well
the applicant and its agents. The district court rendered judg-
ment setting aside the order but dismissed the suit as to the de-
fendants other than the board without prejudice. Only the board
excepted to the judgment and gave notice of appeal. The court
of civil appeals dismissed upon the ground that the board had
no appealable interest in the subject matter of the controversy.
This question had never been directly passed on in Texas by the
supreme court.
In holding that the board had standing to appeal, the court
noted:
11 147 Tex. 366, 216 S. W. 2d. 171 (1949), rev'g 211 S. W. 2d. 303 (Tex. Civ. App.
1948).
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"Articles 1011g through 1011j [TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) ]
are a virtual adoption of a standard zoning statute sponsored by the
Federal Department of Commerce. In providing that the review of the
orders of the board of adjustment shall be by certiorari, the statute
differs from the majority of Texas statutes prescribing the procedure
for the review of orders of administrative boards. These statutes usually
provide that a petition shall be filed against the board or commission
as defendant and expressly authorize appeals.' 12
The court stated that even though the review is designated by a
different name and involves somewhat different procedure, it is
not essentially different from the review contemplated by other
statutes under which the right of a board or commission to appeal
has apparently never been questioned. The public has an interest
in upholding the board's order if it is valid. The board was a
proper party defendant and may, in the public interest, take an
appeal from an adverse decision in the trial court.
The court noted that decisions in other states are not harmo-
nious on the question. Among the cases cited for a contrary view
are two Louisiana decisions,13 both of which involved appeals
taken to a zoning board from a ruling of a city engineer. The
Louisiana Supreme Court held that the Zoning Board of Appeal
and Adjustment, which itself exercised quasi-judicial functions
and was not a party to the proceeding, did not have a legal interest
in maintaining its own decision and could not appeal from a
judgment of a district court reversing it.
Oklahoma. Is a person denied due process of law when he is
not furnished counsel in a hearing before an administrative board,
acting under statutory authority, to revoke his license to practice
dentistry? This question was answered in the negative by the
Supreme Court of Oklahoma in Bancroft v. Board of Governors
of Registered Dentists of Oklahoma.4 On petition by Bancroft
22 Id. at 369, 216 S. W. 2d. at 172.
Is State v. Zoning Board of Appeal and Adjustment, 198 La. 766, 4 So. 2d. 822
(1941) ; State v. Zoning Board of Appeal and Adjustment, 198 La. 758, 4 So. 2d. 820
(1941).
14.__kla. . 210 P. 2d. 666 (1949).
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for review of the findings and the order of the board revoking
his license, the supreme court held that the hearing was not a
criminal prosecution and that the board did not have a duty to
furnish counsel. The dentist was entitled to have counsel of his
own choosing if he desired, but he was not denied due process of
law when counsel was not furnished him, even though he did not
have the funds to pay an attorney. The record showed that Ban-
croft was questioned regarding counsel, and he replied that he
did not have any, did not think one necessary, and also that he
lacked funds with which to hire an attorney.
III. JUDICIAL REVIEW
Texas. The constitutionality of the Firemen's and Policemen's
Civil Service Act 5 was tested in a suit filed by the City of Fort
Worth in the nature of a class bill against all the members of the
Fire and Police Departments.16 The city contended that it was
unconstitutional for the legislature to attempt to create a right
of appeal to the courts from a decision of the civil service com-
mission, as this would be in derogation of the separation of powers
among the three branches of government. The act was held con-
stitutional in this respect by the supreme court.
The lower courts had held part of the act invalid on the ground
that the statute would permit an appeal of an indefinite suspen-
sion or dismissal to the district court, with power in that court to
substitute its judgment and discretion, in a de novo trial, for that
of the other branches of government and thus would constitute an
invalid conferring of power on the judiciary. The supreme court
pointed out that the discretion of the civil service commission was
not made unlimited by the legislature, that the commission can
order removal or suspension of an employee only after it has
determined that he has been guilty of one or more of enumerated
derelictions, that the commission must act reasonably and accord-
15 Acts 1947, 50th Legis., c. 325; Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 1296 m.
16 Fire Department of City of Ft. Worth v. City of Ft. Worth, 147 Tex. 505, 217
S. W. 2d. 664 (1949).
[Vol. 4
1950] SURVEY OF SOUTHWESTERN LAW FOR 1949 257
ing to law, and that its discretion is not beyond judicial review.
The "trial de novo" as applied to administrative orders means a
trial to determine if the order of the administrative body is "free
of the taint of any illegality and is reasonably supported by sub-
stantial evidence." The court's power is limited to upholding or
setting aside the order, and it cannot substitute its discretion for
that of the administrative body. Although in effectuating its judg-
ment the court might order the employee reinstated, the effect of
such order would be only "to return the parties to the status they
occupied before the challenged order was entered."
The question whether or not the supreme court has jurisdiction,
on direct appeal, to pass upon the validity of an order of the
Railroad Commission, not only from the view of constitutionality
of the order but also of its support by substantial evidence, arose
in Railroad Commission v. Sterling Oil & Refining Company.7
The supreme court had previously held in the Seeligson case 8 that
it did have jurisdiction of a direct appeal from the judgment of the
trial court in reviewing the order of an administrative body in
view of Section 3-b of Article V of the Texas Constitution, Article
1738a of TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. (VERNON, 1948), and Rule 499-a
of the TEXAS RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. In the Sterling case it
was contended that the court did not have jurisdiction because
the order was challenged on other than constitutional grounds and
therefore was not a case involving "constitutional validity;" it
was urged that the appeal could not be maintained under Rule
4 99 -a since "it necessitates the bringing to this court of a state-
ment of facts for purposes other than those provided in the rule."
In holding that it did have jurisdiction the supreme court held
that in reviewing the evidence it does not consider the prepond.
erance of the evidence but only whether there is substantial evi-
dence which reasonably supports the order of the commission.
27 147 Tex. 547, 218 S. W. 2d. 415 (1949).
18 Railroad Commission of Texas v. Shell Oil Co., Inc., 146 Tex. 286, 206 S. W.
2d. 235 (1947).
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The latter is a question of law and not one of fact, and therefore
there was no violation of Rule 499-a.
The dissent contended that the amendment confers jurisdiction
by direct appeal only if "constitutional validity" of an order is
involved, not validity in the broad sense of being sufficiently sup-
ported by the facts. The Seeligson and the Guardian Life 9 cases
were said to have involved the question whether an administra-
tive order was authorized by statute. The dissent urged that these
decisions involved "constitutional validity," and were not authority
that the court has jurisdiction in a case where the question is
merely whether or not the order is reasonably supported by sub-
stantial evidence.
On the question when the substantial evidence rule is applicable
in review of administrative or executive orders, where the statute
does not provide for full retrial of facts, three Texas decisions
during the year are of importance.
The rule was held applicable in Fire Department of City of
Fort Worth v. Fort Worth,20 which has previously been discussed.
In this case the court stated the general rule: "the extent of the
judicial review of the order of the administrative agency, the
Commission, is limited to an ascertainment of whether there is
substantial evidence reasonably sufficient to support the chal-
lenged order."
Jones v. Marsh2" resolved the conflict which had arisen in the
courts of civil appeals with respect to the orders of a county judge
in passing upon applications for licenses to sell beer-the Saiz22
case holding that the substantial evidence rule did not apply and
the Peeler" case stating that it did. In deciding that the substantial
evidence rule was applicable, the court said that a "county judge,
in passing upon an application for a license to sell beer, acts in an
19 Board of Insurance Commissioners v. Guardian Life Insurance Co., 142 Tex.
630, 180 S. W. 2d. 906 (1944).
20 Supra note 16.
21148 Tex.- .224 S. W. 2d. 198 (1949).
22 Texas Liquor Control Board v. Saiz, 220 S. W. 2d. 502 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
28 State v. Peeler, 200 S. W. 2d. 874 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
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administrative rather than a judicial capacity." The judge's order
does not possess the finality of a judgment, since the application
must still be submitted to the Texas Liquor Control Board, where
the license is to be issued if the applicant is entitled to it, but may
be refused, under certain conditions, even though approved by
the county judge. "The hearing before the county judge is not
the trial of a right or title; it is a step in the administrative proc-
ess by which a permit or license, which is a mere privilege, may
be procured."24
The court held that under the facts of City of Houston v. Lurie, 5
previously discussed, the substantial evidence rule would not
be applied. The court held that the final determination that prop-
erty is in fact a public nuisance subject to abatement is a judicial
question and cannot be delegated to local legislative or adminis-
trative bodies. "It may well be doubted that a limited review of
the facts, as under the substantial evidence rule, would amount
to a judicial determination of the justiciable question here in-
volved. Trial under that rule would not establish whether or not
the buildings are in fact nuisances, 'in the same manner as any
other facts'."2
Arkansas. The proper scope of judicial review of fact findings
of the Arkansas Public Service Commission arose in two cases
last year. In Wisinger v. Stewart27 the Supreme Court of Arkansas
discussed statutory background and stated that the court tries the
case "de novo" and renders "such judgment as appears to be
warranted and required by the testimony." However, the court em-
phasized that "de novo" review by the court does not mean that
it should proceed as if the commission did not exist and had
never held a hearing. The court said its proper task is "to inquire
whether the determination of the commission was contrary to the
weight of the evidence," and that the order of the commission
24 224 S. W. 2d. at 202.
25 Supra note 1.
26 224 S. W. 2d. at 875. 876.
27 - Ark. - , 223 S. W. 2d. 604 (1949).
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should be upheld unless it was against the weight of the evidence.
In a second case,"8 in which the rule was applied, the court
approved the order of the public service commission, subject to
modifications, stating that the findings of fact by the commission
were not contrary to the weight of the evidence.
In several cases involving appeals from orders of the Work-
men's Compensation Board the scope of judicial review of its
orders appears to be whether the findings were supported by suf-
ficient evidence.2" In Green v. Lion Oil Company ° the court said,
"If the Commission's finding that appellant sustained such an injury
is supported by substantial evidence, the trial court erred in reversing
and setting aside the award of the commission. It is not the province
or duty of either the circuit court or this court on appeal to try de novo
cases heard by the Workmen's Compensation Commission."
The court further stated:
"It is also well settled that the circuit court on appeal from the com-
mission and this court on appeal from the circuit court must give to the
findings of fact by the Commission the same force and effect as the
verdict of a jury or of the circuit court sitting as a jury.... In deter-
mining whether there is suficient evidence to support the award, both
the circuit court and this court on appeal must weigh the testimony in
the strongest light in favor of the commission's findings."'31
This case was cited and followed in Campbell v. Athletic Mining
& Smelting Company,12 where the court stated that the "question is
therefore not whether the testimony would have supported a find-
ing contrary to the one made, but rather whether it supports the
finding which was made."
" Missouri Pacific Transportation Company v. Inter City Transit Company,
Ark.-, 224 S. W. 2d. 372 (1949).
29 H. C. Price Construction Co. v. Southern, - Ark.- , 224 S. W. 2d. 358
'(1949) ; Brook's Inc. v. Claywell, -Ark.-, 224 S. W. 2d. 37 (1949) ; Camp-
bell v. Athletic Mining & Smelting Co., - Ark.-, 223 S. W. 2d. 499 (1949);
Green v. Lion Oil Co., - Ark. - , 220 S. W. 2d. 409 (1949) ; Dundee Woolen
Mills v. Chism. -Ark.-. 219 S. W. 2d. 628 (1949).
30220 S. W. 2d. at 411.
81 Ibid.
32 Supra note 29 at 501.
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New Mexico. In a case of first impression the Supreme Court
of New Mexico held that,, in the absence of statute so authoriz-
ing, a cause could not be remanded to an administrative board
for further proceedings. 3 The court held that "in a proceeding
for statutory review, the court must act within the bounds of
the statute conferring its jurisdiction to review and where the
measure of its power is to determine whether the questioned order
is unlawful or unreasonable, ordinarily it can only approve or
vacate the order."
After an exhaustive study of the question the court pointed out
that the cases do not support authorities 4 whose language is "to
the effect that the general rule, even in the absence of statute,
affirms the right of the reviewing court to remand the cause for
further proceedings before the administrative board whose order
is being reviewed." The court further stated: "Indeed, so far as
the writer's search goes (and it has been extensive) not a single
case has been found in which the cause was remanded to an ad-
ministrative board or authority for further porceedings as, for in-
stance, taking of additional testimony, that lacks the sanction of
statutory or constitutional authorization for the remand." 5 The
court held that the case could not be remanded "for the taking
of additional testimony preliminary to deciding reasonableness
or lawfulness of the order under review, as enjoined by the
statute." The effect of a judgment vacating the administrative
order was to remand the cause to the administrative board for
such further proceedings as might lie within its statutory powers.
The constitutionality of Chapter 128, New Mexico Session Laws
of 1945, was challenged in two cases,86 but in neither was there
33 State ex rel. Transcontinental Bus Service, Inc. v. Carmody, 53 N. M. 367, 208
P. 2d. 1073. 1076 (1949).
84 42 Am. Jur. 689; Public Administrative Law, § 248; 153 A.L.R. 1028 (1944) ; 2
VoN BAUR, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATiVE LAW (1942) § 788.
35 208 P. 2d. at 1079.
36 American Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Shepard, State Treasurer, 53 N. M. 271,
206 P. 2d. 551 (1949); Associated Petroleum Transport Limited v. Shepard, 53 N. M.
52, 201 P. 2d. 772 (1949).
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a decision on the merits. The act involved a tax on the gross
receipts for the use of railroad cars, such receipts being confined
to those derived from New Mexico mileage only. In the Asso-
ciated Petroleum Transport case the holding was that the plain-
tiffs had not exhausted their statutory remedy before the adminis-
trative board and the trial court was not authorized to determine
the merits of the case.
In the American Refrigerator case the court, upon motion for
rehearing, withdrew the opinion filed before the decision in the
Associated Petroleum case had been rendered and substituted an-
other saying that the~decision in the latter case "would have proved
decisive of the appeal in this case since the plaintiff herein did
not exhaust its statutory remedies before the State Tax Commis-
sion before filing the suit out of which this appeal arose." 7 The
court said that before the aid of equity is sought, the statutory
remedies must be exhausted.
It is interesting to note, however, that the first point decided
by the court in the Associated Petroleum case was whether the
taxpayer's protest, required by statute, was timely filed with the
State Tax Commission. The court held that "the complaint and
protest were not timely filed with the State Tax Commission as
required by the Act, and thereafter the Commission had no juris-
diction to hear it.""8 Since this decision has been followed by the
later American Refrigerator opinion, it appears to establish that
a taxpayer in New Mexico who does not timely exhaust his
remedies provided before an administrative board to secure the
correct assessment of a tax cannot thereafter assert its invalidity
before a judicial tribunal.
C. A. Wortham.
37 206 P. 2d. at 552.
38 201 P. 2d. at 774.
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